Report Cards for Homebuilt Aircraft
(c) Ed Wischmeyer
Originally published in Inflight USA
There is a wide range of accepted handling characteristics among factory
built airplanes, and the range is wider still for homebuilts. I continue
to marvel at the range of homebuilt handling characteristics, the subtleties,
the nuances, the quirks, and the gotchas. The truth of the matter is, homebuilt
owner/builder/buyer/pilots are terrible consumers -- we take what’s there,
we don’t ask the right questions, we adapt where we have to, we make excuses
for the manufacturer, and sometimes we die in the effort. My personal flight records show 120 kinds of aircraft flown, more than
two dozen of those being homebuilts. How many of those have, say, been
spin tested? Not all of them!
Well, gee, you say, nobody with any skill is going to accidentally spin
something like, say, a Whizbang 2000. That’s a really fast, really high
wing loading rocket that only the big buck boys will play with, and they
all know how to avoid a spin. Well, maybe they do know how to avoid a spin,
but what happens some day in a slightly tight turn to final with a tired
pilot in gusty conditions? Is there adequate stall warning and adequate
control authority? Is the design so highly tuned that an imprecise customer
airplane will not have the safety margin that the factory (hopefully) demonstrated?
Is any of this documented somewhere in some standard way so that anybody
can find out what’s been tested, what hasn’t, and what the results were? How do you really know what you're getting if you can’t get a full envelope
checkout, or if you’re a prospect? Homebuilders have tremendous freedoms in this country, freedoms to allow
the individual to experiment, to tinker, to try, to do new things. This
is in the best traditions of our country. It’s one thing, however, for
an individual to try things (build and fly their own design), then another
thing for somebody else to want to repeat the experiment (by buying plans),
but quite something else for a manufacturer to offer kits and quickbuilds,
do slick advertising, have booths at airshows and all that as a way of
pursuing business without bothering with the niceties of acceptable handling
characteristics or consumer safety or even full disclosure. But then, suppose a customer takes a standard design and just has to
improve on it a little bit, in that best tradition, and they booger the
design and screw the safety margins. Is that caveat emptor or the kit vendor’s
responsibility? We’d probably all agree on the former, but the kit builder
will still take a publicity hit. Or suppose the airplane is an entry level plane, not advertised as aerobatic,
just a here to there machine. What implicit promise is there, not in a
legal sense, but an expectation in the mind of the owner/builder/buyer/pilot,
that the airplane will be as safe as a Cherokee or a 172? The mission is
the same. The engine is the same. The wife and family are the same. The
expectation is the same. The demonstrated safety is not.
Or suppose the airplane is not really aerobatic, and not suited to aerobatics,
but, due to marketing pressure, they toss in a video clip of the plane
doing a roll. Sure, there may be a disclaimer somewhere, but does that
set customer expectations properly?
Or consider, how many of the cross country cruisers are really good
for IFR? Then again, how many spam cans are really good for IFR? Fuel imbalance,
out of rig airplanes, crappy instruments, bad response to turbulence, lots
of spam cans aren’t so great, either. Supposedly, a NASA report on general
aviation handling qualities some years ago had some uncomplimentary things
to say about general aviation handling qualities for single pilot IFR in
turbulence. Maybe we need a report card for homebuilt handling characteristics,
to let the prospect know what they’re getting into. This is not a catalog
of aircraft, it is a standardized documentation of how aircraft have been
tested. The report card has two parts: to tell how the airplane (at least
the test specimen) really handles; and to document and standardize whatever
formal testing may have been done. The gotcha is that the report card has to be repeatable from evaluator
to evaluator and from customer to customer and from airplane to airplane,
so that anybody can do the tests and everybody will get the same results.
Any third party should be able to duplicate factory results. This means
quantitative, not qualitative. It also means that the report has to be
written in homebuilder-ese, not test pilot-ese.
These tests should be simple enough that they can be completed in a
reasonable time, such as three hours. The tests should be done in light
chop and a crosswind, not in smooth air, for full disclosure.
What things go into a report card? Some of the simple ones would be:
Was the full center of gravity envelope flight tested?
The weight and measured performance of the prototype, with speeds
done from GPS averages
Was spin testing performed? How? At what c.g?
What flutter testing, or ground vibration analysis, was performed?
What crosswind component has been demonstrated?
Static testing, plus and minus, on which components to what limits?
Usable and unusable fuel capacity in different configurations.
There should also be measures of how the plane responds to poor pilot
techique. For example, what happens in the flare if a quick tug is put
on the elevator? What happens if you stall with the ball one width out
of center? What happens if the stall recovery is slow? What happens if
you touch down 5 degrees off heading? What happens in various kinds of
bounced landings?
Some of the quirks and gotchas that I’ve observed in flight (most of
these can also be found on certificated spam cans) include:
Overly sensitive pitch during the landing flare
Low pitch forces for wide range of speeds on approach
Unusual changes in pitch forces needed during takeoff rotation
Poor yaw stability, even in cruise
A frisky Dutch roll mode excited by turbulence and very difficult
to damp out
Inadequate aerodynamic stall warning
Significant change in handling characteristics with c.g. change
Yaw / pitch control coupling
Asymmetric left / right handling
High pitch forces on go around
I’ve also heard about, and avoided flying in, planes which cannot be
trimmed to approach speed, or planes which are pitch unstable at landing. One (qualitative) way of doing a report card on handling would be to
do this on a comparative, not absolute basis. For example, in landing flare,
the PieChaser, the Whizbang Y2K, and the Spamcaneroo would all be in one
group. The Duck, the Canard, and the PickleFork would all be in another
group. This would at least give you a clue as to what you were getting,
and this idea, what planes fly similarly, is already well accepted, although
not codified.
Demo flights are not adequate for a prospect to adequately evaluate
an airplane. Demo flights are usually too short, too benign, too exhilirating,
for a prospect to objectively examine the whole flight envelope. The idea
of a demo flight is to sell the customer on the plane, not to inappropriately
focus on what may be minor shortcomings. And besides, very few prospects
will have the flying skill or experience to evaluate a complete flight
envelope.
There are obstacles to the report card idea, of course. I’ve observed
one vendor who was defensive and not objective with regard to his product,
and heard him badmouth and discount criticism -- in this case, takeoff
figures measured at 1000 feet above sea level and 90 degrees, those being
unrealistic conditions for evaluating his pleasure craft. Maybe it’s not
supposed to be flown in the summer. Several vendors were so accustomed
to their product lines that some major handing shortcomings were not considered
significant. Yet another design was tweaked by a test pilot who, I suspect,
was so skilled that the handling shortcomings weren’t noticed. And exaggerating
manufacturers are all too common. Another obstacle is the quality of the plane tested. A plane with light,
low friction, well lubricated and adjusted flight controls will handle
differently from one beset with stiction and friction, or one with erroneous
angles of incidence. An indication of airframe variation comes from the
good folks at Glasair, who some years ago lowered their published performance
numbers to be representative of what even their less skilled builders were
achieving, not just what the good builders and the factory got.
There are liability and good will issues, as well. Very few pilot reports
are truly candid, because the truth, harshly presented, can hurt the manufacturer,
hurt advertising revenues, hurt relationships with organizations, and hurt
the sport flying movement. Unfortunately, lack of candor can hurt enthusiasm,
can hurt bank accounts, and can hurt occupants. Report cards might help.
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